Many Petri nets-based methods have been developed and applied to analyze cryptographic protocols. Most of them offer the analysis of one attack trace only. Only a few of them provide the analysis of multiple attack traces, but they are rather inefficient. Similarly, the limitation of the analysis of one attack trace occurs in most model checking methods for cryptographic protocols. Recently, we proposed a simple but practical Petri nets-based model checking methodology for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, which offers an efficient analysis of all attack traces. In our previous analysis, we assume that the underlying cryptographic algorithms are black boxes, and attackers cannot learn anything from cipher text if they do not have a correct key. In this paper, we relax this assumption by considering some algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm. Then, we apply our new method to TMN authenticated key exchange protocol as a case study. Surprisingly, we obtain a very efficient analysis when the numbers of attack traces and states are large, and we discover two new attacks which exploit the algebraic properties of the encryption.
Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are protocols which use cryptographic techniques to achieve certain tasks while preventing malicious parties from attacking the protocols. There are many applications of cryptographic protocols, for example, authenticated key exchange protocols, web security protocols, e-payment protocols, e-banking protocols, e-voting protocols.
The design and analysis of cryptographic protocols are difficult to achieve because of the increasingly sophisticated attacking capabilities and the complex requirement of the applications. Attacks in many cryptographic protocols have been found after they have been designed [1] , [2] and even after implemented e.g. [3] , [4] . Thus, it is desirable to have a method which is able to analyze all possible attacks to the protocols. Such a method would offer a comprehensive understanding of all vulnerabilities of protocols and certainly would help in developing a better and total protection for them. In this paper, we focus on message replay attacks [5] and the analysis of multiple sessions of protocol execution only.
Many Petri nets-based methods have been developed Manuscript and applied to analyze cryptographic protocols [6] - [12] . Most of them offer the analysis of one attack trace only. Only a few of them provide the analysis of multiple attack traces, but they are rather inefficient. In fact, all of them employ an off-the-fly trace generation technique. It means that after a state space is generated either partially or fully and an attack state is found, then an attack trace is computed. This kind of trace generation is called off-the-fly, since the trace computation occurs after the state space is generated. The analysis of a single attack trace is rather limited, since one attack trace shows only one way amongst many possible ways to carry out an attack. Similarly, the limitation of the analysis of one attack trace occurs in most model checking methods for cryptographic protocols [14] - [16] , [18] - [22] .
Recently, we proposed a very simple but practical Petri nets-based model checking methodology for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, which overcomes this limitation [39] . Our methodology offers an efficient analysis of all attack traces, and is essentially independent of model checking tools for the full and explicit state space analysis. We employ a novel method which is the on-the-fly trace generation for computing all attack traces. In the new method, while a state space is generated, attack traces for states are computed at the same time, and are stored at the states. In other words, the trace computation occurs at the same time as the state space computation. This technique provides a notable improvement in the computation time for all attack traces when the number of attack traces and the number of states are large. Then, we applied our new method to two case studies, which are Micali's contract signing protocol [30] and TMN authenticated key exchange protocol [31] . We found many new attacks on the two protocols However, in our previous analysis, we assume that the underlying cryptographic algorithms are black boxes, and attackers cannot learn anything from a cipher text if they do not have a correct key. In this paper, we relax this assumption by considering some algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm. In particular, we consider the homomorphic property of RSA encryption. Then we apply our new method to TMN authenticated key exchange protocol as a case study. Surprisingly, we found two new attacks which exploit the homomorphic property. In addition, we obtain a very efficient analysis when the numbers of attack traces and states are large. In fact, when the number of states and traces are 126,536 and 11,676, respectively, our method improves over the off-the-fly trace generation on the computation times by 5,043%. In particular, our on-the-fly method reduces the computation times from 25 hours in the off-thefly method to 29 minutes. We implement our methodology in Coloured Petri Nets (CPN) [32] and use its model checker tool called CPNTools [33] to do the experimental analysis. Our preliminary results were reported previously [36] - [38] .
Furthermore, the comprehensive analysis of all attack traces has not received adequate attention in the literature. In this paper we would like to point out the importance of this kind of analysis and show its use when analyzing algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm in protocols. Indeed, the importance of the analysis is even clearer when dealing with algebraic properties of encryption, since the analysis shows clearly many different attacking ways to create the same damage, e.g. to expose a session key. Those attacks are significantly different. Thus, our analysis offers a thorough examination of all attacks.
In Sect. 2, we provide the background on TMN protocol and Coloured Petri nets. In Sect. 3, we compare our new method with existing related works, and discuss known attacks on TMN protocol. In Sect. 5, we present our new CPN methodology and apply it to TMN. Furthermore, in Sect. 5 new attacks are explained, the comparison on the performance between our on-the-fly method and the off-the-fly method is discussed, and an analysis of our method is given.
Background
We use the following notations throughout the paper. S → R : M means that user S sends message M to user R. While {M}PK-I means public-key encryption by the RSA algorithm on message M by I's public key, E K (M) means the Vernam cipher or one-time pad on message M by key K. In is an attacker. Also, In(A) means that the attacker who impersonates user A. While 1) -4) describe protocol steps in the 1st session, 1') -4') indicate protocol steps in the 2nd session. [31] TMN is a cryptographic key exchange protocol for mobile communication system. TMN allows initiator A to exchange a session key with responder B by the help of server J. The detail of TMN is described as follows.
TMN Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol
where K ab is an exchanged session key and K aj is A's secret which is used to transport the session key at the last step. Note that the session key is created by user B.
It is well-known that RSA public key encryption satisfies the following homomorphic property [40] .
{M1}PK × {M2}PK = {M1 × M2}PK where × means the multiplication modulo the public mod-ulus. Note that throughout the paper, × means the multiplication modulo the public modulus. Therefore, a thorough analysis on TMN must deal with the homomorphic property of RSA public key encryption too. [32] CPN is a graph-based modeling language which is equipped with model checking algorithms and tools. CPN has been applied to many applications, for example, distributed systems and communication protocols. In CPN, a system is first modeled by a kind of graphs, called a net, and then a state space of all possible executions of the system is generated and analyzed to search for errors in the system. CPN provides a software tool called CPNTools [33] which facilitates the creation, the modification and the analysis of nets. Originally, CPN and CPNTools provide the off-the-fly trace generation method. Also, only a single error trace or attack trace can be detected by the built-in mechanism in CPN-Tools.
Coloured Petri Nets

Related Works
Existing Petri Nets Methods for Cryptographic Protocols
Many Petri nets-based methods, which are equipped with model checking algorithms, have been developed and applied to analyze cryptographic protocols [6] - [12] . All of them [6] , [8] - [12] with one exception [7] aim at analyzing only one attack trace. The exception [7] offers the analysis of multiple attack traces, but it is inefficient. In fact, all of them employ an off-the-fly trace generation technique which means that an attack trace or multiple attack traces are computed after a state space is generated either partially or fully. The off-the-fly trace generation for all attack traces involves the searching for all paths between two states in a state space, which is extremely time-consuming. Indeed, the searching for all paths can be seen as a core part of algorithms for solving the traveling salesman problem which is known to be NP-complete. Nieh and Tavares's method [6] is the first work which applies PN to analyze security protocols. Their approach is based on CPN and provides a generic model of an attacker for message replay attack in a single session of protocol execution. Some attacks are discovered in some protocols. Later on, Lee et. al.'s works [7] , [8] developed place/transition nets which are low-level nets to analyze security protocols. Their method [7] was applied to analyze multiple attack traces for the message replay attack. Also, TMN was chosen as a case study, but only known attacks on TMN were reconstructed. Another low-level PN was developed to analyze a key recovery protocol [8] . But the analysis is on the recoverability of a key rather than the message replay attack. Also, both works [7] , [8] deal with the analysis of a single session only.
Al-Azzoni et. al. [9] have developed a CPN model to analyze TMN protocol. Their method appears to analyze two sessions of protocol execution. However, it does not really analyze two concurrent sessions but two sequential sessions according to the detected attack reported in the work. Their CPN model is well-structured. But attacker capabilities in their model are quite limited. Indeed, our CPN model extends their work to analyze multiple concurrent sessions of protocol execution and to analyze more attacking capabilities, namely, a new session initiation by the attacker, receiver impersonation and message dropping. Dresp [10] applied CPN to analyze a security protocol. The work strictly analyzes a single session, but can be used to analyze two sequential sessions by executing one session at a time.
Bouroulet and Devillers [11] developed a specification language and a verification for security protocols. A security protocol and attackers are specified by a language based on process algebra. For verification, the specification is translated into a high-level PN. Then, a general purpose high-level PN model checker called Helena is applied. Their method offers the analysis of multiple concurrent sessions. However, their method can analyze only one attack trace.
Liu et. al. [12] applied two PN methodologies to analyze an authenticated key exchange protocol in wireless network. In particular, they employ CPN to reproduce a known attack in the protocol by the simulation analysis and employ PEP [13] to detect the known attack by the state space analysis. In their state space analysis, only one known attack trace is reproduced and a single session is analyzed.
Indeed, PEP [13] indigenously computes one attack trace only. However, it can be used to compute multiple attack traces. The verification in PEP, called the unfolding, is considered as the off-the-fly trace generation method, since the search for attack traces is performed after a state space is computed partially. This amounts to the search of all paths in a graph.
Other Model Checking Methods for Cryptographic Protocols
Many model checking methods [14] - [25] have been developed and applied to analyze cryptographic protocols. All of them except for NRL [23] , SATMC [17] , Proverif [24] , [25] and Scyther [27] , [28] offer the analysis of one attack trace only. For the exceptions, while NRL is inefficient, SATMC and Proverif can compute a restricted kind of attack traces only, not all attack traces. Scyther can compute a greater number of attack traces than all others. We will discuss more about Scyther below.
In this paper, we focus on the discussion of methods which currently analyze multiple attack traces, but we will also discuss one well-known existing method which analyzes a single trace. A more detailed discussion on each method can be found in another work of our group [39] .
SPIN [29] is a widely used explicit model checker which provides the analysis of a single trace. SPIN is employed to analyze a cryptographic protocol [19] . A known attack to a protocol is detected. SPIN is based on the onthe-fly verification which offers an advantage in that only a partial state space which is relevant to a verification property is constructed instead of the full state space. During the construction, a single attack trace is computed and is stored in a stack. SPIN can thus be considered as the on-the-fly trace generation but for a single attack trace only.
SATMC [17] which stands for SAT-based Model Checker employs the satisfiability approach for model checking. One of the interesting features of SATMC is that it can compute a single partial order attack. A partial order attack represents some specific kinds of multiple attack traces where some parts of the traces are partially ordered and other parts are totally ordered. The partially ordered parts of the traces are traces which can be interleaved without any effect, are grouped into a set and are interpreted by parallel execution. However, a single partial order attack represents only a specific structure of attack traces but not all possible attack traces, since all possible attack traces cannot always be organized into a single total order of sets of interleaving attack traces.
Both NRL [23] and Proverif [24] , [25] analyze multiple attack traces and they are based on the logic programming approach. NRL can compute all attack traces, but its approach is inefficient, since it uses the path-searching in an entire state space. Thus, it is based on the off-the-fly trace generation. On the other hand, Proverif can compute only a restricted set of attack traces which contains only one trace in most cases, according to their experiment and analysis. Note that this restricted set of attack traces is far from the set of all attack traces.
Recently, Maude-NPA [26] , a successor of NRL, has been developed. It appears that Maude-NPA records an attack trace into each state during the backward computation of a state space. However, the main purpose of Maude-NPA for recording an attack trace is to allow users to debug a protocol during the computation rather than to compute all attack traces as this is evident by the following sentence quoted from the paper [26] :
Note that two extra state components (the message sequence, or attack trace, and some auxiliary data) are associated to a Maude-NPA state ..., but they are irrelevant and useful only for user debugging of the protocol, ...
In addition, there is neither discussion nor analysis of the advantageous point of recording an attack trace to a state for computing all attack traces in Maude-NPA [26] . Our approach has been developed independently of their method, and we provide a comprehensive analysis on the computation of all attack traces by two different methods as discussed in Sect. 5.6.
Scyther [27] is a high performance model checking tool that is capable of analyzing the unbounded verification. Currently, Scyther does not offer the analysis of algebraic properties of encryption. Scyther provides the analysis of all attack traces. But the analyses of all attack traces in Scyther and in our method are different. There are attacks found by Scyther but not found by our method, and there are at-tacks found by our method but not found by Scyther too. Scyther computes a state space for a specified total number of instances of user roles, but with many possibilities of the assignment of the number of instances to each user role within the same state space. For example, with the total of 4 instances of users, Scyther analyzes many possibilities, for example, 2 instances of initiator and 2 instances of server, 2 instances of responder and 2 instances of server, and 1 instance of initiator and 1 instance of responder and 2 instances of server. However, our method computes a state space for a fixed number of instances for each fixed user role. Thus, the attacks found by Scyther but not found by our method are those which occur in the other assignments than the fixed one in our method. But we argue that all the attacks found by Scyther can be found in our method by computing a state space with each possible assignment or configuration as which will be discussed in Sect. 5.2.
For TMN with black-box encryption and with 1 instance of initiator, 1 instance of responder and 2 instances of server, we found 10 attacks that allow the attacker to learn the session key, but Scyther found 3 attacks only, and these can also be found by our method. In addition, for the attacks that allow the attacker to learn the session key and fool the initiator to accept K aj as a session key, we found 10 attacks, but Scyther found none. Note that the security analysis of TMN in Scyther reported here was done by running the tool on TMN supplied with the tool [28] as an example. The details of the attacks are given in the appendix.
Known Multiple-Session Attacks on TMN
In the literature, there are two kinds of known multi-session attacks on TMN. The first kind does not exploit the homomorphic property whereas the second kind does. In the first kind, there are four known attacks [20] , [22] , [35] . In the first attack found by Lowe and Roscoe [20] , the attacker learns the session key K ab and A's secret key K aj . Thus, the attacker can then learn all the subsequent communications between the users. The second attack [22] is a variant of the first one. In the third and the fourth attacks found by us [37] , user A is fooled to commit on a fake session key known by the attacker, and the attacker learns the valid session key K ab . Thus the attacker can impersonate B to A by using the fake key and can impersonate A to B by using the correct session key.
In the second kind of known multiple-session attacks on TMN, there is one known attack found by Simmons [31] . In the attack, the attacker modifies message at step 1 by using the homomorphic property. We show the first attack in the following.
At step 1') of the second session, the attacker computes the cipher text {K aj ×K c }PK-J from the cipher text {K aj }PK-J and {K c }PK-J by using the homomorphic property. At the completion of the two sessions, the attacker In learns (K aj ×K c ), and then obtains K aj by computing the multiplicative inverse of K c . Also, by the cipher text at step (4), the attacker obtains K ab .
Lowe and Roscoe [20] argued that this attack is useful when J is able to detect the reuse of the cipher text, encrypted by J's public key, at steps 1 and 3 in the multiple concurrent sessions.
A Modified Version of TMN
To illustrate our new attacks by using the homomorphic property clearly, we will consider a modified version of TMN instead of the original TMN. The modified TMN is similar to the TMN, but J has the ability to detect the reuse of the cipher texts at steps 1 and 3 in multiple concurrent sessions. In addition, user A has the ability to check if the exchanged session key is identical to A's secret K aj . So, if the session key is identical to K aj , then A will abort the session. So, the modified TMN is more secure than the original TMN. Also, the analysis of the modified TMN would demonstrate the importance of attacks using the homomorphic property.
Our Model
Our General Methodology
In the following, we present our general methodology which is independent of model checking tools for the full and explicit state space analysis. Our methodology consists of five steps which are (1) protocol and attacker representation, (2) computations of a decomposed state space and multiple attack traces, (3) characterization of and search for attack states, (4) attack trace extraction and (5) attack trace classification. Our on-the-fly trace generation is employed in steps 2 and 4.
(1) Both a protocol and an attacker models are represented. In fact, such representation depends on a model checker tool.
(2) Then, a state space is generated from the representation. During the state space generation, when a state is generated, an attack trace to the state is computed at the same time and the computed trace is stored at the state. This computation is the core of the on-the-fly trace generation. Figure 1 illustrates the on-the-fly trace generation process in general. In the figure, a 1 , a 2 and a 3 stand for message sending by users or attackers. In state s 3 , the path or trace <a 1 ,a 2 > to the state is stored in the state. Conceptually, an attack trace for a state is constructed by simply extending an attack trace stored in the previous state.
For simplicity, we assume that each state stores only one attack trace. Thus, our state space in general may contain a greater number of states than the state space in the off-the-fly trace generation. A state which can be reached by two different attack traces in the off-the-fly method becomes two different states in our method. To reduce the size of a computed state space, we employ a decomposition technique in the state space computation. Our decomposition technique aims to generate a state space for one specific attack scenario at a time.
An attack scenario is defined by a configuration which consists of the information for the protocol execution in a multi-session setting, for example, the identities of initiator and responder, the role of attackers, secrets and nounces in each concurrent session, and a schedule of a specific interleaving execution of the multiple concurrent sessions. Thus, a decomposed state space contains one interleaving execution of multiple sessions, instead of all. However, we can explore each attack scenario one by one by computing a state space for each possible configuration. Note that it can be seen that our configuration contains a fixed number of instances for each fixed user role in each session.
(3) After the state space is obtained, attack states for each kind of attacks are specified and searched in the state space. An attack is characterized by a vulnerability event which is an event potentially leading to a compromise of protocols. Vulnerability events are protocol-dependent.
(4) When an attack state is found in the state space, an attack trace is extracted from the state immediately. By searching for all attack states of the same attack, all attack traces of the same attack can be obtained without any path searching. In other words, the computation for all attack traces is reduced to the searching for attack states which can be done very efficiently and linearly on the number of states.
(5) The number of attack traces obtained can be quite large. We propose textual trace analysis technique to classify such a large number of attack traces. Those attack traces are classified by using attack patterns which are minimal but necessary protocol traces for an attack. The development of an attack pattern is manual, because it is protocoldependent. But the attack classification is automatic. Attack traces that contain the same attack pattern are classified into the same group of attack traces. As a result, a large number of attack traces is reduced to a reasonable number of attack patterns which are easier to analyze.
Our Method for the Modified TMN
In this section, we discuss the assumptions of our protocol analysis. We also describe vulnerability events of TMN, and a configuration of the protocol execution. 1. There is one attacker (In) . The attacker abilities are based on Dolev and Yao's attacker assumption [41] , but our attacker can modify any public-key cipher text by using the homomorphic property. Such a modified cipher text contains at most the multiplication of two keys as its plain text. Also, the attacker is allowed to create cipher texts by single encryption only, not by multiple and nested encryption. More generally, the attacker can create only messages with a bounded length. 2. For RSA public key encryption, we consider two properties: the homomorphic property and the commutative of the multiplication. 3. We consider the execution of two different concurrent sessions of the protocol where such execution can be performed in an interleaving and non-sequential manner between multiple sessions. 4. A well-behaved initiator and a well-behaved responder are involved in one session only, but they may or may not take part in the same session. While the server is involved in two sessions, the attacker may involve in up to two sessions. 5. The attacker has one secret (symmetric) key K i .
In 3, we do not consider two identical sessions, since the message replay between them does not produce any new information but duplicates one and thus it is not useful for an attack.
In 4, a well-behaved initiator and a well-behaved responder are involved only in one session amongst the concurrent two sessions, because we are interested mainly in analyzing a man-in-the-middle attack where an attacker impersonates the initiator and the responder in the remaining session. Even though we assume that the server is involved in the two sessions, our attacker can impersonate the server in one session, two sessions or none. Therefore, our method produces a finite set of all attack traces, because we consider the finite setting of attack analysis. However, in general the set of all attack traces can be infinite due to the unbounded length of messages and the unbounded number of sessions.
Attack states are characterized by vulnerability events. For the TMN protocol, there are two basic vulnerability events which are secret disclosure by an attacker and session key commitment by initiator and responder. Based on the two basic events, the following combined vulnerability events can be created. 3 ] to describe each combined vulnerability event where KB 1 stands for keys that are known by the attacker, and KB 2 and KB 3 stands for keys that are committed by users A and B, respectively, at the completion of the protocol.
In event 1, the attacker learns all later communication between A and B, because the attacker knows the session key between A and B. In fact, events 2 and 3 can be seen as a kind of man-in-the-middle attack in that the attacker can impersonate B to A by using key K i or MK, respectively, while the attacker can impersonate A to B by using key K ab .
Definition 4 (Configuration):
A configuration of a decomposed state space computation consists of ((S 1 , S 2 ,. . . ,S n ), Sch) and S i = (s,I,R,T,K) for 1≤i≤n where n is the number of concurrent sessions, and 1. S i is a session information for the i-th session which consists of a. s is a session identity. b. I, R and T are identities for an initiator, a responder and a server, respectively. c. K is a list of keys for each party (including attacker) which consist of a pair of public and private keys, and a shared key with a specific party 2. Sch is a multi-session schedule which means a specific interleaving execution of multiple concurrent sessions of protocol runs
We consider the following four configurations according to our assumptions. Note that K and Sch are omitted for simplicity.
1) (1,A, In all configurations, we consider the multi-session schedule for the man-in-the-middle attack [42] .
Our CPN Model for the Modified TMN
Our CPN model extends Al-Azzoni et. al.'s CPN model [9] to provide the analysis of all attack traces and the analysis of multiple concurrent sessions. We refer to the work [9] for the background on the basic structure of protocol and attacker representation. In the following, we discuss some main parts of our CPN model only.
Our CPN model consists of three main levels: top, entity and control. The top level shows the interaction between all parties including the attacker, and the entity level shows the detailed behaviour of each party. The control level controls the model execution according to an input configuration. Figure 2 shows the top level. There are 4 entities in our model which are A, B, J and attacker In. Exchanged messages at all protocol steps pass through the attacker In. Since there are four steps in TMN, there are four corresponding paths between relevant parties in the model. For example, path <A, P1, In, P2, J> corresponds to protocol step 1.
We implement the on-the-fly trace generation in CPN by recording incrementally into a state each message sent by users and attackers. In CPN, a state is represented by tokens at all places. So, to record a trace into a state, we simply store all sent messages as tokens into a global place, i.e. place ETrace. Figure 3 shows the entity level of user A for the first step of the protocol. Transition T1 is to compose a message and transition T3 is to send the message to a communication channel. The global place ETrace, which is adjacent to transition T3, stores a tuple (lk1, lk2, lk3, tr) where lk1, lk2 and lk3 stand for [KB1], [KB2] and [KB3], respectively. Also, tr stands for an attack trace which is represented by a list of tuples (s, step, sid, rid, msg) where s is a session identity, step is a protocol step number, sid is sender identity, rid is receiver identity and msg is the sent message. When a new message is sent, tr is appended with a new tuple for the new message. Similarly, in other users' model and the attacker model, a transition which sends a message to a communication channel would record an attack trace tr with appropriate 
KB1, KB2 and KB3 into place ETrace.
For the attacker model, we create a CPN graph for each protocol step. The attacker graph aims to intercept a message at each step and to send a modified message instead. Figure 4 shows a CPN graph for step 1. Transition T1 is to intercept the message at step 1 from A, and transition T4 is to send a modified message to J. Since the message can be divided into two parts which are initiator identity and a pair of responder identity and a cipher text, the attacker graph for step 1 employs two attacker sub-graphs which are intru i mi and intru m mi, respectively. Figure 5 shows the graph for intru m mi. In the figure, transition T1 is to decompose the pair of messages, and transition T2 is to decrypt the cipher text. Note that the detail of transition T2 is omitted here. Transitions T3 and T4 shows two ways to compose a modified message at step 1 by using the homomorphic property. While T3 takes two existing cipher texts from attacker's database and multiplies them, T4 takes two plain texts and a key from attacker's database, multiplies the plain texts and encrypts the result by the key.
The homomorphic property of RSA is modeled in our CPN method by using the list data structure and some user- The homomorphic property discussed in 2.1 is obtained in our method as follows.
E P ([M1])ˆˆE P ([M2]) = E P ([M1]ˆˆ[M2])
It should be noted that the commutative of the multiplication holds due to the commutative of elements in the list.
It is assumed that plain text M cannot be extracted directly from cipher text [(M,P)]. But M can be obtained from the cipher text if the corresponding private key is given to a decryption function.
In our model shown in Fig. 5 , we use two user-defined functions modf and en which represent the multiplication and encryption function E, respectively. Also, t stands for the number of terms taken for the multiplication.
To specify a configuration, we use four tokens: fss, ak, bk and a multi-session schedule token. Tokens fss, ak and bk are stored in place Conf in Figs. 3 and 4 , but the multisession schedule is stored in place Sche in Fig. 6 . Token fss(s,i1,i2,i3,i4) contains information about actual initiator identity i1, actual responder identity i2, impersonated initiator identity i3 and impersonated responder identity i4 in session s. Tokens ak(i1,k1) and bk(i2,k2) contain initiator's secret key k1 for responder i1 and responder's session key k2 for initiator i2, respectively. The multi-session schedule is represented by list of session identities [s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ] which stands for a specific interleaving execution of a protocol step between multiple sessions in the order specified by the list.
To compute a decomposed state space by a configuration, we employ the control level. The control level shown in Fig. 6 schedules the interleaving execution of multiple sessions according to the input schedule. When session s is scheduled for execution of a single protocol step, the control graph would inform all other graphs by creating in place S session state token (s,sp,st), where st is a session status and sp is the current protocol step number to be executed, with ready status. The execution of a protocol step involves three graph models which represent the sender, the attacker and the receiver of the step. After the receiver has stored the received message from the sender into her database, the session state token is set to inactive status. Then, the control is passed back to the control graph to perform further scheduling.
Searching for Attack States in a State Space
The state space computation is done by using state space tools provided by CPNTools. After a decomposed state space is obtained, we search for attack states in the state space by running CPN-ML programs which extract specified nodes from the state space. In fact, our programs compute attack states for each vulnerability event.
The following program finds states where the attacker knows some key. In other words, it finds states for [KB1]. val LeafNodes=ListDeadMarkings(); fun SecrecyViolation1(k:LK) : Node list = PredNodes(LeafNodes, fn n => (cf(cK(k), Mark.SymDec'P3 1 n) > 0), NoLimit); SecrecyViolation1(K ab ) produces a set of all terminal states in the state space where the key K ab is in the attacker's database. The terminal states are states which do not have any further computation, and they mean states at the end of protocol execution. The end of protocol execution means either the normal termination after the last protocol step or an abnormal termination where the latter is caused by the attacker who may drop or tamper with messages during transmission. It is sufficient to consider terminal states instead of all states, since the attacker's database on keys is never decreased and likewise for user A's database on an exchanged session key. Therefore, there is no loss of data at terminal states. Also, in many cases we obtain full details of attack traces at terminal states.
Function (Mark.SymDec'P3 1 n) returns a multi-set of tokens at place P3 in page SymDec in state n, and they mean data in attacker's database. cK is a constructor used to indicate a key in attacker's database. Function cf(c,ms) produces the number of appearance of token colour c in multi-set ms. Also, function PredNodes(a,p,l) searches area a with search limit l and produces a list of all nodes that satisfy boolean function p. Further details about functions used in this program can be found at CPNTools [33] .
There is a similar program to the above program, but it computes states where user A accepts some key as a session key at the last protocol step. By taking the intersection between the results from the two programs, we obtain attack states for our vulnerability events. Note that there is no need to compute states where user B accepts a key as a session key, since B accepts only her own generated key which is K ab .
Due to reasons of space, we omit the details on the extraction of all attack traces from states and the attack classification.
New Attacks in TMN
We argue that the analysis of all attack traces is important in that it helps us to discover all possible ways to attack protocols. In the modified TMN, the analysis shows all possible ways that the attacker can modify messages using the homomorphic property to evade the detection of the replay attack by the server and compromise the protocol. We found two new kinds of attacks. While Simmons's attack exploits the homomorphic property at step 1, our two new attacks exploit the homomorphic property at step 3 and at steps 1 and 3, respectively.
In the first kind of our new attacks, there are two categories. The first category is the attack at step 3 in one session while the second category is the attack at step 3 in two sessions. Below, attacks 1.1.1 -1.1.3 and 1.2.1 -1.2.3 are in the first and second categories, respectively, of the first kind of attacks. Also, in the following, we describe all attacks in two multiple sessions of protocols where, in the first session, A communicates with B, but in the second session, the attacker impersonates both A and B to server J.
There are three vulnerability events for attacks in the first category of the first kind. In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 2. (1) and (3), respectively, then cipher text E Kaj (K i ) is created and sent to A. As a result, A is fooled to commit on a fake session key K i . It can be seen that the attack exploits the homomorphic property at step 3') of the second session.
In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 1 for the first category of the first kind. In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K ab ) This attack also demonstrates another way to modify message at step 3') by using the homomorphic property. After steps (4) and (4'), the attacker learns all secrets K aj and K ab . Then, the attacker can create cipher text E Kaj (K ab ) which is sent to A at step (4) . So, A commits on the correct session key.
In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 3 for the first category of the first kind of attacks. In this attack, the attacker fools A to commit on a multiplicative key (MK). There are many possible multiplicative keys and in the following, we show the third attack for multiplicative key (K aj ×K ab ). In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K aj ×K ab ) This attack demonstrates another way to modify message at step 3') by using the homomorphic property. After steps (4) and (4'), the attacker learns all secrets K aj and K ab . Then, the attacker can create cipher text E Kaj (K aj ×K ab ) which is sent to A at step (4) . So, A commits on a fake session key. This attack is different from attack 1.1.1 in that the attacker does not have to disclose his own secret K i to A.
For the second category of the first kind of attacks, there are also three vulnerability events. In the following, we discuss an attack for vulnerability event 2. It is important to note that the attacker modifies messages at step 3 in two sessions by using the homomorphic property. We also find a variant of Simmons's attack where the homomorphic modification occurs at step 1) in two sessions.
We show an attack for vulnerability event 1 of the second category of the first kind in the following. All steps in the attack are identical to attack 1.2.1, except for the following step 4. There are many possible multiplicative keys that the attacker can fool A to commit. But in this attack, we show for multiplicative key (K aj ×K ab ).
Next, we discuss attacks in the second kind which exploits the homomorphic property at steps 1 and 3. Also, there are two categories of the second kind of attacks. The first category is the attack at steps (1) and (3) in the same session while the second is the attack at steps (1) and (3) in two different sessions. However, both categories lead to the three vulnerability events. Below, attacks 2.1.1 -2.1.3 and 2.2.1 -2.2.4 are in the first and second categories, respectively, of the second kind of attacks.
The following shows an attack for vulnerability event 2 of the first category. It should be noted that the attacker modifies messages at steps (1') and (3') in the second session by using the homomorphic property. Since {K aj }PK-J and {K i }PK-J are delivered to J at steps (1) and (3), respectively, A is fooled to commit on fake session key K i by cipher text E Kaj (K i ) at step (4).
The following attack leads to vulnerability event 1 of the first category. In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K ab ) This attack also demonstrates another way to modify messages at steps (1') and (3') by using the homomorphic property. After steps (4) and (4'), the attacker learns all secrets K aj and K ab . Then, the attacker can create cipher text E Kaj (K ab ) which is sent to A at step (4) . Then A commits on the correct session key.
In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 3 in the second category. All steps in the attack are identical to attack 2.1.2, except for the following step 4. In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K i ) It should be noted that the attacker modifies the message at steps (1') in the second session and message at step (3) in the first session by using the homomorphic property.
In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 1. In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K ab ) This attack also demonstrates another way to modify messages at steps (1) and (3) in two different sessions by using the homomorphic property. In this attack, the message at step (1) is modified in the first session, and the message at step (3' ) is modified in the second session.
In the following, we show an attack for vulnerability event 3. Since {K aj }PK-J and {K aj ×K ab }PK-J are delivered to J at step 1 and 3, respectively, then A commit to multiplicative key K aj ×K ab as a session key by cipher text E Kaj (K aj ×K ab ) at step 4.
There is another interesting variant of attack 2.2.1 where the attacker modifies message at step (1) in a session and also modifies messages at step (3) in two sessions. This variant belongs to the second category of the second attack since the message modification at steps (1) and (3) In(A) → A : B, E Kaj (K i ) It can be seen that the attacker modifies the message at step (1) in the first session, but modifies messages at step (3) in two sessions.
In fact, there are many variants of attacks discussed above, but those variants are slightly different from the attacks shown. We omit them for reasons of space.
Performance
In this section, we compare the results between our on-thefly and the off-the-fly trace generation methods both of which are implemented in CPNTools model checker. The experiment is done by using CPNTools version 3.0 and a PC with Intel Core2 Duo 2.33 Ghz and 2 GB of RAM.
In Table 1 , we show the comparison of the sizes of the state spaces between the two methods for the four configurations. The four configurations are discussed in Sect. 5.2. In the worst case, the number of states and arcs in the onthe-fly method are increased for 39% and 33%, respectively. However, in the best case the number of states and arcs are increased for only 17% and 13%, respectively. In the table, n and a mean the increment percentage (Inc%) of nodes and arcs, respectively, in the on-the-fly method when comparing with the off-the-fly method.
In Table 2 , we compare the computation times for state spaces between the two methods for the two configurations which are for the largest and the smallest number of states. Also, we compare the computation times for attack traces (tr) and for both state spaces and traces (total) in Tables 3  and 4. In Tables 3 and 4 , events (ev) 1 and 2 correspond to vulnerability events 1 and 2, respectively. But events (ev) 4, 5 and 6 are events other than vulnerability events 1 and 2 where the attacker learns K ab , K aj and both K ab and K aj , respectively. Note that vulnerability event 3 is included in event 6. Also, in Tables 3 and 4 , Imp% stands for the improvement or reduced percentage of the total computation times in the on-the-fly method when comparing with the offthe-fly method.
It is clear that our on-the-fly method improves the overall computation times tremendously. When the numbers of states and traces are large, for example in event 5 of Table 3 , it takes about 29 minutes (1,749 sec.) in our method, but about 25 hours (89,960 sec.) in the off-the-fly method. It should be noted that the off-the-fly trace generation method requires a large amount of time, because it searches all paths between an initial state and each attack state. As discussed in Sect. 3.1, the search of all paths can be considered as a main part of the solutions to the traveling salesman problem which is known to be NP-complete. When the numbers of states and traces are small, for example in event 1 of Table 3 , it takes about 37 seconds in our method, but about 49 Table 2 The comparison of the computation times in seconds for state spaces for two configurations.
Config
On-the-fly Off-the-fly 1) (1,A, seconds in the off-the-fly method. Indeed, our on-the-fly method requires more times for state space computation, but the off-the-fly method requires much more times for trace generation. It should be noticed that in Tables 3 and 4 , when the number of traces is increased, the time for trace generation in the off-the-fly method grows greatly, but the time for trace generation in our method is almost constant. Even though our on-thefly method requires a larger state space than the off-the-fly method, our method offers a much faster trace computation. In particular, the size of a state space in our method is increased at most 39%, but the total computation times in our method are reduced, at best, 5,043%.
Analysis
As discussed in Sect. 5.1, our on-the-fly trace generation method requires a greater number of states than the offthe-fly method, when there are states that can be reached by different attack traces in the off-the-fly method. Those states are called merging states. Recall that each state in our method stores only one attack trace. Thus, a merging state reachable by multiple attack traces is divided into multiple states in our method. In fact, the more merging states there are in the off-the-fly method, the larger number of states the on-the-fly method has. From here on, merging states refer to the off-the-fly method, but the division of the states refers to the on-the-fly method.
Merging states are caused by the removal of different information in previous states, which results in identical states. For example, if two states are different on some data and a transition which occurs at the states removes the data, then two states are merged into the same next state. On the other hand, if the information in states is added with various possibilities after some transitions, then those states are split into multiple next states according to the possibilities. In general, a state contains two main kinds of information: messages exchanged between all entities and data stored at each entity's database where an entity means a user or an attacker. Since sent messages are usually stored at receivers' databases, the information in a state can be characterized mainly by data at all entities' databases. Therefore, the removal of such data that cause the difference between states is responsible for merging states. We assume below that any removal of the data will result in merging states.
Data at attacker's database are never removed, since the attacker always keeps those data for attacking protocols subsequently. However, data at users' databases may be removed, since those users want to minimize their resources as soon as they finish their tasks in the protocol. For example, in a general authenticated key exchange protocol, while a server does not keep any data in a session after the completion of its tasks in the session, initiators and responders keep exchanged session keys and related session information within their databases for further communications between them.
If the information in users' databases is removed at an earlier protocol step, then the on-the-fly method requires a larger number of states. This is because the removal at an earlier step results in merging states nearer to the top of the state space. Then, the division of the merging states requires a large number of additional states, because states below the merging states need to be copied in order to store different attack traces. Thus, the higher position the merging state is, the larger number of additional states the on-the-fly method requires. However, the division of merging states near to the bottom of the state space does not require many additional states, since there are not many states at the bottom. In general, the protocol step in which data in users' databases are removed can be determined by the last step that a server is involved in a protocol. If the last step is near to the end of a protocol, then the number of additional states required in the on-the-fly method is small due to the occurrence of merging states near to the bottom of a state space. Otherwise, the number of additional states required can be very large.
In TMN, initiator A and responder B keep their data after the end of session execution, but server J removes session data after J sends the message at step 4. During the session execution, server maintains session information (src, dest, k1, k2, s) where src is an initiator identity, dest is a responder identity, k1 is initiator's secret sent at step 1 and k2 is a session key sent by the responder at step 3 and s is a session identity. Before the session information is removed from J's database, the message at step 4, which contains dest and a cipher text generated by k1 and k2, is sent to and stored at A. Thus, only some session information such as src and s is removed from users' databases. Note that the removed session information causes the difference between states. Since the removal occurs at the last step, the number of additional states required is not too much.
We have examined protocols in the Clark/Jacob library [1] to discuss the generality of our method. We found that there is no removal of the data in 23 protocols, but there is some removal in 18 protocols. In the latter, the removal takes place at either the last step or the next-to-the last step for 8 protocols, and the removal occurs between the first step and step n/2, where n is the total number of steps in each protocol, for 4 protocols. Thus, in 31 out of 41 protocols the number of additional states required in the on-the-fly method should be acceptable. Also, it is in only 4 protocols that the number of additional states in our method would be very high.
Discussion
We do not claim that our tool is the fastest. But we would like to point out the advantage of the on-the-fly trace generation over the off-the-fly trace generation in terms of the computation times. Note that the off-the-fly trace generation can be considered as a conventional method to compute all attack traces. In addition, we believe that many existing model checking methods can be extended to deal with the analysis of all attack traces. But, currently, most of them provide only the analysis of a single attack trace. So it is our objective in this paper to point out the importance of the analysis of all attack traces and to show the practical use of this method as discussed above.
As a future work, we aim to optimize the memory requirement for the state space in the on-the-fly trace generation. Also, we aim to explore other algebraic properties of encryption algorithms in other protocols.
Conclusion
The comprehensive analysis of all attack traces for cryptographic protocols has not received adequate attention in the literature. In this paper, therefore, we would like to emphasize the importance of the analysis and show its use when analyzing algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm in protocols. In particular, in this paper, we extend our previous method to analyze some algebraic properties of the underlying encryption algorithm in cryptographic protocols. Then we apply it to TMN protocol. As a result, we found two new attacks. The result also shows that our method improves over the conventional method with respect to the total computation times, by 5,043% in the best case. 
